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Summary
By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the 
European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency 
monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model 
to analyse the establishment and functioning of the EEAS. These mechanisms aim 
to ensure the EEAS’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to 
pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal 
that the EEAS is tightly controlled by the EU member states. Moreover the European 
Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. The application 
of the principal–agent model to control the EEAS is not without its limits. The model 
falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an 
outlier to this model.
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 Introduction
The European Union’s (EU) incoherent and ineffective response to interna-
tional developments so far this century has highlighted the need to improve 
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the Union’s external action. A major attempt to address the shortcomings took 
shape in the framework of the European Convention (2002-2003), where the EU 
member states and supranational institutions laid the foundation for the insti-
tutional modifications that were intended to invigorate EU foreign policy. The 
European Convention proposed several novelties, such as the creation of the 
posts of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will also hold the posi-
tion of the European Commission’s Vice-President (HR/VP). The proposal to 
establish the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the centrepiece of 
the EU’s revamped foreign policy architecture.
After the failure of the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty 
(2005), the actual establishment of the EEAS was postponed until the enact-
ment of the Lisbon Treaty (2009). Analysis of the negotiation process reveals 
that the EEAS is the product of a compromise between the EU member states, 
the Commission and the European Parliament. The outcome of the compro-
mise is evident in the EEAS’s sui generis nature of being neither a supranational 
nor an intergovernmental body: having unique linkages with the EU member 
states; being somewhat accountable to the European Parliament; and receiving 
a requirement to cooperate with the European Commission. Not only does the 
EEAS connect the rest of the EU’s external actors through assisting, support-
ing and cooperating, it also employs its own staff members from the Council 
Secretariat, the Commission and the EU member states’ diplomatic services.1
Although the EEAS was built on the EU’s existing structures, its hybrid insti-
tutional composition is a new experiment for the EU, which already had a very 
sophisticated institutional architecture. It is therefore puzzling that rather 
than shift power to the Council Presidency or the Council Secretariat, over 
which the member states have more control,2 the ‘non-integrationist’ member 
states agreed to delegate powers to the EEAS agent, which has a very complex 
structure, is placed outside of the Council, and operates in both communitar-
ian and intergovernmental decision-making modes. The establishment of a 
new agent with unprecedented characteristics raises questions about whether 
the member states that delegated the EEAS’s discretion to manage the EU’s 
external action on their behalf are indeed able to monitor and control effec-
tively the actions of the EEAS. By applying the principal–agent model, this 
article examines the member states’ principal control of the EEAS agent.
1    Art. 27(3) TEU.
2    See Hylke Dijkstra, ‘Explaining Variation in the Role of the EU Council Secretariat in First 
and Second Pillar Policy-making’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 17, no. 4 (2010), 
pp. 527-544.
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In order to assess whether the member states put in place effective con-
trol mechanisms to tie the EEAS to its mandate, this article relies on quali-
tative methods and a triangulation of data collected from multiple sources, 
including legal documents, semi-confidential papers, journalistic articles, sec-
ondary literature and 68 off-the-record interviews that were conducted with 
key actors to gain insight into the behind-the-scenes struggles. Those inter-
viewed are, inter alia, staff members of the EEAS, members of the EU member 
states’ permanent representations to the EU, officials of the European Com-
mission’s relevant Directorates-General (DGs) and key members of the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
The EEAS’s innovative organizational structure has attracted the increasing 
attention of research communities. Scholars applied a neo-realist interpretation3 
and argued for the need to go beyond intergovernmentalist explanations4 
when analysing the EEAS. Competing theoretical approaches have also been 
applied to explain the attitudes of EEAS staff towards the process of setting 
up the EEAS, as well as towards the service’s structure and composition.5 
A few studies have applied the principle-agent model to assess the EEAS’s 
discretion in specific areas of performance, namely in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
development6 and the Eastern Partnership.7 Building on the existing literature 
and going beyond the analysis of specific areas of the EEAS’s performance, 
this article makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the lit-
erature. Theoretically, the analysis composes a principal–agent account that 
serves as a foundation for the systematic examination of the control of the 
EEAS. Empirically, the article contributes not only to our understanding of the 
3    Michael Kluth and Jess Pilegaard, ‘The Making of the EU’s External Action Service: 
A Neorealist Interpretation’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (2012), pp. 303-322.
4    Federica Bicchi, ‘The EU as a Community of Practice: Foreign Policy Communications in the 
COREU Network’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011), pp. 1115-1132.
5    Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, ‘In the Face of Adversity: Explaining the Attitudes of 
EEAS Officials vis-à-vis the New Service’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 20, no. 9 (2013), 
pp. 1332-1349.
6    Mark Furness, ‘Who Controls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU 
External Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (2013), pp. 103-126.
7    Hrant Kostanyan and Jan Orbie, ‘The EEAS’s Discretionary Power within the Eastern 
Partnership: In Search of the Highest Possible Denominator’, Journal of Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, vol. 13, no. 1 (2013), pp. 45-62; and Hrant Kostanyan, ‘Examining the 
Discretion of the EEAS: What Power to Act in EU–Moldova Association Agreement?’, The 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (2014), pp. 373-392.
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establishment of the EEAS’s organization and functioning, but also adds to our 
knowledge of the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy architecture in general. 
The article finds that the EU member states closely monitor and control the 
EEAS through so-called ‘police patrol’, which is a direct monitoring of an agent 
by a principal. Moreover, the Commission has tools for ‘horizontal checks’ 
of the EEAS, which is a mechanism of an indirect control. The European 
Parliament, which played an important role in the establishment process of 
the EEAS, is an outlier to the principal–agent model.
After this introductory section, the article presents the principal–agent 
framework. Analysis in the third section focuses on the ex-ante control of the 
EEAS. The fourth section details ex-post police patrol and horizontal check-
monitoring and control of the EEAS agent. Fifth, the article identifies the possi-
bility of sanctioning the EEAS through staffing, financing and agency revision. 
The final section sums up and discusses the main findings.
 The Principal–Agent Model and Control of the EEAS
A principal–agent relationship is ‘created when one party, the principal, enters 
into a contractual agreement with a second part, the agent, and delegates 
responsibility to the latter for carrying out a function or set of tasks on the 
principal’s behalf ’.8 Following Hawkins et al., the ‘principal’ is defined as the 
actor capable of both granting and withdrawing power.9 In the application of 
the model, this article considers the EU member states as sole principal, since 
only they can delegate power to the EEAS agent to act on their behalf. Unlike 
the vertical and hierarchical relations between the EU member states’ princi-
pal and the EEAS agent, the Commission’s relations with the EEAS are horizon-
tal and non-hierarchical. However, applying the principal–agent model to the 
control of the EEAS is not without limits, especially when conceptualizing the 
role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to the model. 
8    Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, ‘The Principal–Agent Approach and the Study of the 
European Union: Promise Unfulfilled?’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 1 (2003), 
p. 125.
9    Darren G Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, ‘Delegation 
under Anarchy: States, International Organizations and Principal–Agent Theory’, in Darren 
G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney (eds), Delegation 
and Agency in International Organizations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp. 3-39.
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The principal–agent model assumes that a principal delegates its power to 
an agent to maximize the possibility of achieving the pursued objectives or to 
ensure the credibility of the principal’s commitment. The agent, however, is 
perceived as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’10 that is able to develop its own 
preferences over time and to strive for their realization. Therefore, the princi-
pal is faced with the challenge of obtaining ‘perfect compliance from agents’.11 
The principal’s willingness to transfer power to a given agent is thus condi-
tioned by its ability to control the agent.12
The principal sets control mechanisms that aim to tie the agent to the 
granted mandate and thus to minimize the agent’s ability to pursue its own 
objectives independent of the principal. Through control mechanisms, the 
principal retains the ability to ‘mitigate conflicts of interest through the care-
ful design of incentive contracts but can rarely control agents perfectly’.13 
Paradoxically, containing agency losses might require ‘undertaking measures 
that are themselves costly’14 and can therefore undo the anticipated benefits 
of delegation. The principal thus seeks to strike a balance between the control 
and autonomy of an agent in a way that would allow the agent to perform its 
mandate effectively. 
This study assembles the control mechanisms of the EEAS in ex-ante — that 
is, before establishment of the EEAS — and ex-post — that is, after establish-
ment of the EEAS — groups, continued by its sanctioning through staffing, 
budget and revision of the mandate. Ex-ante administrative procedures intend 
to define the scope of agency activities, outline the legal instruments (for 
example, regulation and economic incentives) and set the procedures that an 
agent is required to follow in performing delegated functions.15 Administrative 
requirements are useful, in particular for the purpose of combating infor-
10    Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 47.
11    Michelle Egan, ‘Regulatory Strategies, Delegation and European Market Integration’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5 no. 3 (1998), p. 489.
12    Bart Kerremans, ‘What Went Wrong in Cancun? A Principal–Agent View on the EU’s 
Rationale towards the Doha Development Round’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, 
no. 3 (2004), p. 366.
13    David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics 
Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 28.
14    Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties 
and the Appropriation Process (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 27.
15    Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda 
Setting in the EU (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 40.
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mational asymmetries, but are not sufficient for the effective control of 
agency activities. 
The principal therefore resorts to ex-post oversight procedures to monitor 
and control the agency’s activity.16 So-called ‘police patrol’ by the EU member-
state principals provides the means for direct monitoring of the behaviour of 
the EEAS agent. Moreover, the Commission has tools to exercise horizontal 
checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. In addition, the EEAS is accountable to the European 
Parliament in a number of areas (such as budget and staff). The information 
collected through monitoring is particularly valuable if used to reward or 
‘sanction’ the agent in a manner that incentivizes the agent ‘to comply with 
the principal’s objectives and intentions’.17 The principals may sanction their 
agent for non-compliance with the stipulated mandate, specifically through 
staffing, financing and revision of the mandate. 
 Ex-Ante Control of the EEAS
The European Convention (2002-2003) was the forum for the conception of 
the EEAS. The Convention’s Working Group on External Action was the first 
to put forward a blueprint for the establishment and functioning of the EEAS 
and the post of its head — the HR/VP. In its final report, the Convention’s 
Working Group suggested a number of scenarios for the reconstruction of EU 
external action. The first scenario proposed measures that would strengthen 
the role of the HR and create synergies between the competences of the HR 
and the DG External Relations (Relex) Commissioner, while keeping the two 
functions separate. Another option was to merge the functions of the HR and 
the Relex Commissioner and to bring the new HR under the direct author-
ity of the President of the European Council. The report also put forward 
the option of a full merger of the HR with the Commission, while safeguard-
ing the specificity of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now 
CSDP) decision-making.18 The latter option, in particular, was supported by 
the European Commission and the European Parliament,19 since it was in line 
with the interest of the institutions to strengthen the supranational character 
16    Pollack, The Engines of European Integration, p. 42.
17    Egan, ‘Regulatory Strategies, Delegation and European Market Integration’, p. 489.
18    European Convention, ‘Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action’, 2002, 
CONV 459/02, p. 19.
19    European Convention, ‘Letter from Mr Giuliano Amato, on behalf of the Party of European 
Socialists, Mr Elmar Brok on behalf of the European People’s Party and Mr Andrew Duff, 
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of EU foreign policy and thus expand their respective competences. A group of 
small EU member states such as Finland and the Benelux countries also agreed 
with transferring foreign policy to the European Commission, while keeping 
separate the decision-making on the CFSP. Conversely, bigger member states 
such as the United Kingdom and France were categorically against the move.20 
The eventual establishment of the EEAS and HR/VP was the result of a 
compromise that had already been proposed by the Convention between two 
major camps of the EU member states. According to this option, the new HR/VP 
combines his/her predecessor’s and the Relex Commissioner’s mandates and 
is supported by the EEAS, which is neither part of the Commission nor part of 
the Council Secretariat. On the one hand, the compromise on the EEAS made it 
possible for the member states that were against the integration of EU foreign 
policy to maintain their control over the EU’s external action. If the EEAS is to 
be integrated into the European Commission, EU foreign policy would become 
more communitarian, giving the EU’s supranational institutions a greater say 
in decision-making at the expense of the EU member states’ control. Starting 
from a neo-realist interpretation, Michael Kluth and Jess Pilegaard argue that 
the United Kingdom and France compromised on the establishment of the 
EEAS to compensate for their decreasing global influence.21 London and Paris 
expected the EEAS to act in line with their foreign offices because of their dom-
inance. On the other hand, the EEAS was not merged with the Council’s struc-
tures, where the EU member states have even greater control,22 thus satisfying 
the pro-integration member states and institutions. 
As in the pre-Lisbon Treaty stage, the member states maintain tighter and 
more direct control in areas where the EU conducts its CFSP and CSDP than 
over issues beyond the CFSP.23 Although the EU acquired a ‘single legal per-
sonality’, the so-called communitarian and intergovernmental areas of EU 
on behalf of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party’, 2003, CONV 829/03, 
pp. 17-18.
20    Niklas Helwig, ‘EU Foreign Policy and the High Representative’s Capability–Expectations 
Gap — a Question of Political Will’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 18, no. 2 (2013), 
pp. 235-254; and European Convention, ‘The Comments by Mr Peter Hain to the Prelimi-
nary Draft Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action’, 2002, WD 021-WGVII.
21    Kluth and Pilegaard, ‘The Making of the EU’s External Action Service’.
22    See Dijkstra, ‘Explaining Variation in the Role of the EU Council Secretariat in First and 
Second Pillar Policy-making’, pp. 527-544.
23    Hans Merket, ‘The European External Action Service and the Nexus between CFSP/CSDP 
and Development Cooperation’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 17, no. 4 (2012), 
pp. 625-652.
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external action preserve their separate decision-making procedures.24 Therefore, 
decision-making in the area of the CFSP has formally remained intergov-
ernmental. In practice, this division is visible in the structure of the EEAS, 
where units dealing with the CSDP are isolated from the geographical units.25 
Distinctive control mechanisms for each of these areas govern the decision-
making processes and are therefore ex-ante transferred into respective func-
tions covered by the EEAS. 
Moreover, in order to ensure the continuation of the existing EU member 
states’ competences in the CFSP, the member states attached provisions to 
the ‘Final Act’ of the Lisbon Treaty at the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC). The declaration states that the establishment of the new HR post and 
the EEAS shall not affect member states’ foreign policy, their national repre-
sentation in third countries, or international organizations. Moreover, the 
provision adds that CFSP decision-making shall not prejudice member states’ 
security policy.
Although the Lisbon Treaty conferred on the HR/VP the right to make pro-
posals on the establishment of the EEAS, on 1 December 2009 the European 
Council endorsed the proposal prepared by the Council’s rotating presidency 
before the HR/VP (Catherine Ashton) was appointed. The European Council 
therefore limited the discretion prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty for the HR/VP, 
stripping her of the advantage of the first mover and in practice providing her 
with ‘guidelines’ to follow.26 The presidency proposal brokered in the frame-
work of COREPER II (the Comité des représentants permanents, Committee of 
Permanent Representatives — in this case, heads of mission) sets out inter alia 
the EEAS’s legal status, scope, financing, staff delegations and the authority 
of the HR.
Through the negotiation process that started in the European Convention 
and resulted in the Lisbon Treaty and the Council’s decision establishing the 
EEAS, the EU member states sketched out the scope of EEAS activity, outlined 
the instruments to be used by the EEAS and set the procedures that the EEAS 
was mandated to follow. Analysis of ex-ante control points to the restrictive 
administrative procedures that the member states apply in order to control the 
24    Article 24(1) TEU.
25    Michael E. Smith, ‘The European External Action Service and the Security–Development 
Nexus: Organizing for Effectiveness or Incoherence?’ Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 20, no. 9 (2013), pp. 1299-1315.
26    Leendert  Erkelens and Steven Blockmans, ‘Setting Up the European External Action 
Service: An Act of Institutional Balance’, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 8, 
no. 2 (2012), pp. 246-279.
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EEAS. Although these procedures play a significant role in keeping the agent 
in line with its mandate, they do not provide sufficient grounds to combat pos-
sible opportunistic behaviour by an agent. Moreover, the sensitivity of foreign 
policy and the changing strategic political environment, in addition to lack of 
guarantees that the EEAS will actually follow its contractual obligations and 
not engage in opportunistic behaviour, make the creation and application of 
ex-post control mechanisms a logical choice.
 Ex-Post Control of the EEAS
 Police Patrol
Police patrol oversight refers to the active monitoring of an agent directly by 
the principal, with the purpose of identifying agency violations of the goals 
that are inherent in the contractual relationship between principal and agent. 
Monitoring of the agency’s activity by the principal is carried out on a regu-
lar basis. However, police patrol involves the principal’s active participation 
and therefore comes with a high cost.27 The member state principals use the 
European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER II), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and 
the CFSP-related Council working groups as forums for monitoring and con-
trolling the EEAS’s action in EU foreign policy decision-making. An EEAS offi-
cial shared: ‘The member states assume that we should think what they think 
and my colleagues also often ask: “What would the member states think?”  ’28
Through the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council was 
designated as an EU institution with a permanent President elected for two 
and a half years, renewable once. In practice, the European Council became a 
central player in the EU’s external action, especially by setting the guidelines 
of EU foreign policy.29 The member states are represented in the European 
Council through their heads of state and government. The HR/VP participates 
in the European Council without being its member. 
The Lisbon Treaty divided the Council into the General Affairs Council 
(GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The FAC conceptualizes the 
27    Mathew  McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms’, in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds), Congress: 
Structure and policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 427.
28    Interview, August 2014.
29    Niklas Helwig, Paul Ivan and Hrant Kostanyan, The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: 
Reviewing the First Two Years of the EEAS (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2013), pp. 18-20.
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EU’s external action based on the guidelines set by the European Council, and 
ensures the consistency of EU actions.30 Although the HR/VP chairs the FAC 
meetings, prepares the agenda, presents the draft conclusions and shares the 
FAC’s findings with the press, she is not a member of the Council and in prac-
tice conducts the CFSP and the CSDP according to the mandates granted by 
the member states.31 Theoretically, the HR/VP is charged with managing the 
agenda of the FAC. However, in practice the EU member states’ foreign minis-
ters pull the strings. For example, in 2012 the United Kingdom managed to put 
Pakistan on the agenda, France inserted issues related to Sahel, and the United 
Kingdom and Denmark prioritized anti-piracy measures.32 The new construct 
therefore puts the HR/VP and the EEAS in a functionally weak position, with 
no tools to counter the transition of member state-driven priorities onto the 
FAC agenda. 
COREPER II comprises EU member states’ ambassadors working on politi-
cal, commercial, economic and institutional matters and preparing the FAC 
meeting. In contrast to the FAC, PSC and CFSP-related groups, COREPER II is 
not chaired by the HR/VP or the EEAS, but instead by the Council’s rotating 
presidency. An EEAS official highlighted in an interview the consequences of 
this arrangement: ‘For example, the summits are prepared by the EEAS in dif-
ferent working groups, but then the final discussion is in COREPER, chaired 
by the rotating presidency, which might not have great interest in that par-
ticular summit or in that particular agenda’.33 Although the EEAS currently 
participates in COREPER II meetings through a member of a corporate board, 
COREPER II ambassadors often sideline the HR/VP and the EEAS. The ambas-
sadors hold working dinners up to five times a week. They meet for coffee and 
lunch breaks. Besides formal meetings, they also meet in smaller groups to 
resolve differences.34
The PSC, which is responsible for monitoring issues relating to CFSP/CSDP, 
has been gaining in importance in preparing the EU’s foreign policy dos-
siers and has become an actor in its own right. Although COREPER II has the 
competence to approve issues that were agreed in the PSC, its agenda is so 
heavy that it instead mostly ends up approving the decisions that are made by 
30    Art. 16(6) TEU.
31    Art. 16(6) TEU. 
32    Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, ‘The European External Action Service 
and agenda-setting in European foreign policy’, Journal of European Public Policy vol. 20, 
no. 9 (2013), pp. 1316-1331.
33    Interview, July 2015.
34    Mai’a K. Davis Cross, ‘Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the 
EEAS’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16, no. 4 (2011), pp. 452.
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the PSC.35 Although the EEAS chairs the PSC, post-Lisbon modifications mean 
that its discretion has remained limited. The EEAS has not been able to resist 
the member states putting their priorities on the PSC’s agenda. The EEAS’s fail-
ure to prevent the PSC trip to Moldova and Ukraine is but one example.36
Post-Lisbon arrangements not only changed the chairs of the FAC and the 
PSC, but also altered the chairmanship of the Council working groups that are 
related to the CFSP. Currently, the EEAS replaces the rotating presidency in 
chairing sixteen working groups.37 Formally, the working group chairpersons 
appointed from the EEAS answer to the PSC chair and the HR/VP. They are 
responsible for organizing the meetings and determining the agenda within 
the group. However, a chairperson explained the limits of his agenda-setting 
powers by posing a rhetorical question: ‘Formally I can say no to a member 
state about putting an issue on the agenda, but would it be in my interest?’38 
Therefore, the EU member states control the EEAS in the Council working 
groups, both through their formal decision-making rights and through infor-
mally influencing the agenda-setting competence of the chair.
 Horizontal Checks vis-à-vis the EEAS
The principal may establish several agencies with conflicting incentives that 
may well check each other through competition for the reasons of their sur-
vival or competence maximization. Since the resources are limited in a given 
institutional framework, rational agents compete, which creates ‘indirect 
mechanisms of control, a form of mutual restraint or “horizontal control” ’.39 
As stated above, the European Commission has tools to play the role of hori-
zontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. 
In theory, the HR’s functions as the European Commission’s Vice-President 
and head of the EEAS are the highest-level links between the Commission and 
the EEAS. In practice, however, a Commission official shared in an interview 
35    Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 76-77; and Ana E Juncos and Christopher 
Reynolds, ‘The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 12, no. 2 (2007), pp. 127-147; and interviews  in 2011-2012.
36    Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, ‘The European External Action Service 
and Agenda-setting in European Foreign Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 20, 
no. 9 (2013), pp. 1316-1331; and interviews in 2011-2012.
37    Helwig, Ivan and Kostanyan, The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture.
38    Interview, June 2011.
39    Nadia Klein, European Agents Out of Control? Delegation and Agency in the Civilian– 
military Crisis Management of the European Union, 1999-2008 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2010), p. 43.
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that linking the EEAS and the Commission through the position of HR/VP did 
not function well during the first HR/VP’s tenure: ‘Ashton was never really 
present as a VP of the Commission and therefore frankly also neglected the 
meetings of the group of the External Relation Commissioners. This is what 
[Federica] Mogherini [the current HR/VP] aims to change by focusing on her 
Commission’s VP hat’.40
During the establishment of the EEAS, the Commission made a number of 
successful attempts to curtail the powers of the HR/VP. When introducing the 
new Commission in November 2009, the President of the Commission sep-
arated the portfolio of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) from the 
Relex Commissioner and added it to the responsibilities of the Commissioner 
for Enlargement. As a result, although the complete portfolio of the Relex 
Commissioner was supposed to be transferred to the HR/VP, responsibility for 
the ENP remained within the Commission, thus limiting the power of the HR/
VP in neighbourhood policy. In practice, this meant that the HR/VP shared com-
petences on neighbourhood policy with the Neighbourhood Commissioner.41
In December 2010, staff from the European Commission’s DG Relex (585 
officials) and from parts of DG Development (93 officials) were transferred to 
the EEAS. Prior to the transfer, however, the European Commission made the 
second successful attempt at curtailment. The first College of Commissioners’ 
formal meeting on 17 February 2010 decided to transfer staff of the DG Relex 
dealing with international climate-change negotiations to the Commission’s 
new DG for Climate Action. The energy task force was moreover moved to 
the Commission’s DG for Energy. The European Commission therefore pre-
vented moving integral parts of the DG Relex staff to the EEAS, keeping them 
in the Commission,42 and thereby contradicting the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty. 
However, a Commission official countered during an interview: ‘The argument 
can be played both ways. For example, why do you have people in the Russia 
divisions in the EEAS who are formally responsible for energy, when it is the 
Commission that deals with energy?’43
The Council’s decision instructs the EEAS and the Commission services to 
consult each other in all aspects of EU external action with the exception of 
the CSDP, yet the interviews with staff of the EEAS and the Commission reveal 
tensions between the EEAS on the one hand and, inter alia, the Commission’s 
40    Interview, December 2014.
41    Hrant Kostanyan, ‘Don’t Fix What Ain’t Broke: A German-led Proposal to Change How the 
Neighbourhood Policy Is Managed Is Misguided’, European Voice (3 March 2013).
42    Erkelens and Blockmans, ‘Setting Up the European External Action Service’, pp. 250-251.
43    Interview, December 2014.
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DG DEVCO (Development and Cooperation), DG ELARG (Enlargement), 
DG ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) and DG TRADE (Trade) 
on the other.44 The ongoing ‘turf wars’ between the EEAS and the European 
Commission are aggravated in cases where there are no clear instructions 
about which of the two has competence, about who should take the lead on 
what issue and at what stage? The ‘Vademecum on Working Relations with 
the European External Action Service’, which was produced by the Secretariat-
General of the European Commission in January 2011, provided grounds for 
some sort of modus vivendi, yet it did not eliminate the tensions between the 
EEAS’s relationship with the Commission DGs in areas such as humanitarian 
aid, development, enlargement, trade and the European neighbourhood.45
Despite the Lisbon Treaty’s intention to bring more coherence to EU exter-
nal action through the establishment of the new HR/VP post and the EEAS, in 
practice the division between development (dominated by the Commission) 
and security policy (dominated by the EEAS) was maintained.46 The HR/VP 
and the EEAS are charged with contributing the EU’s external action instru-
ments. However, the EU’s development-related instruments (see more below) 
remain within the Commission’s responsibility.47 It is yet to be seen whether 
the EEAS’s 2013 review, the cluster system since 2014 with the new group of 
External Relations Commissioners under the chairmanship of the HR/VP and 
the creation of the DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 
(NEAR) will facilitate improvement of the relationship between the EEAS and 
the European Commission.
 The European Parliament as an Outlier 
As a result of the post-Lisbon Treaty modifications in general and the estab-
lishment of the EEAS in particular, the European Parliament widened its pow-
ers in a number of areas of EU external action and vis-à-vis the EEAS. Elisabeth 
Wisniewski argues that because of the strong democratic profile of the 
European Parliament, as well as inter-institutional dynamics and constraints, 
the European Parliament managed to gain more power than the Lisbon Treaty 
44    Interviews, 2011-2013.
45    Interviews, 2011-2013.
46    Smith, ‘The European External Action Service and the Security–Development Nexus’.
47    Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Establishing the 
Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service’, Official Journal of 
the European Union (2010), L 201/30-40, art. 9(1).
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actually prescribes.48 Indeed, despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty grants 
the European Parliament a mere consultative role in the establishment of the 
EEAS, the European Parliament has successfully used its co-decision powers on 
the EEAS’s financial and staff regulations to acquire de facto co-decision power 
on establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS.49 As a partici-
pant of the European Convention has stated: ‘The drafters of Lisbon going back 
to the European Convention Treaty did not see this coming’.50 The European 
Parliament managed to become a full member of the so-called ‘quadrilogues’ 
(that is, the European Parliament, the High Representative, the Council and 
the Commission) that negotiated the decision establishing the EEAS. 
The European Parliament has used the negotiations to solidify and increase 
its say, not only in issues such as the HR/VP’s political accountability, but also 
in influencing the creation of the post of chief operating officer of the EEAS, 
the balance of geographic and gender representation within the EEAS staff, 
the exchange of views with the Heads of Delegations and the access to con-
fidential information of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).51 
Prior to adopting the decision to establish the EEAS, the European Parliament 
managed to secure two important documents: the ‘Declaration by the High 
Representative on Political Accountability’ (DPA); and the ‘Statement by the 
HR in the Plenary of the European Parliament on the Basic Organization of the 
EEAS Central Administration’ (SCA).
The MEPs succeeded in broadening the HR/VP’s obligation to inform the 
European Parliament about the aspects of the CFSP before their adoption.52 
The European Parliament’s role in concluding the EU’s international agree-
ments was also strengthened. However, unlike the agreements falling under 
community matters, the European Parliament’s consent is still not required 
in CFSP areas. The European Parliament extended its supervisory role over 
the appointment of EU foreign policy actors (see below). In the budgetary 
sense, the EEAS was made accountable to the European Parliament (also see 
below). The European Parliament was also successful in its efforts to stress 
48    Elisabeth Wisniewski, ‘The Influence of the European Parliament on the European 
External Action Service’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 18 no. 1 (2013), pp. 81-102.
49    Wisniewski, ‘The Influence of the European Parliament on the European External Action 
Service’; and Kolja Raube, ‘The European External Action Service and the European 
Parliament’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 7, no. 1 (2011), pp. 65-80; Interviews, May, 
June and July 2011.
50    Interview, May 2011.
51    Raube, ‘The European External Action Service and the European Parliament’.
52    Interviews, June-July 2011.
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the promotion of democracy and human rights as an important aspect of the 
EEAS’s actions. A day before the European Parliament gave its approval to 
the decision establishing the EEAS, the HR/VP promised serious attention for 
democracy and human rights promotion.53 Replacement of the HR/VP in the 
plenary of the European Parliament remains a contentious issue and is likely 
to be reopened in the upcoming revision in 2015. Under the current arrange-
ment, the HR/VP will be replaced either by the relevant Commissioner or by a 
representative of the rotating or trio presidency (that is, three successive presi-
dencies working closely together). 
Whereas the European Parliament has certainly increased its role in EU 
external action and the EEAS is somewhat accountable to MEPs, it cannot be 
considered to be a principal, since the European Parliament does not have 
the power to delegate to the EEAS. The European Parliament cannot be con-
sidered as a horizontal check vis-à-vis the EEAS, since it is not an ‘executive’ 
body and does not operate at the level of an agent implementing EU external 
action, but instead exercises a legislative, supervisory and budgetary role. The 
principal–agent framework therefore does not capture the role of the European 
Parliament. 
 Controlling through Sanctions
 Staff
Principals may use their power of appointment — namely, to appoint, dismiss 
or refuse to reappoint agency personnel — as a tool to sanction agents. The 
applicability of the power of appointments as a control tool by the principal is 
conditioned by the rules governing the contractual relationship between the 
agent and the principal. In some cases, the principal is in a good position to use 
the power of appointment as a tool to control agency activity. By contrast, in 
other cases, when an agent has to ensure the credibility of the principal’s com-
mitments, the appointing powers of the principal are reduced to maximize the 
independence of the agency’s activity.54
In the EU structure, the option of using the power of appointment by the 
member-state principals to control EU agents varies across institutions and 
functions. Although the HR/VP is consecrated as ‘the Appointing Authority’, 
the principals’ power over EEAS staffing is a major controlling tool. In the early 
53    HR/VP, ‘Speech by High Representative Catherine Ashton to the European Parliament on 
the Creation of the European External Action Service’, Strasbourg (7 July 2010).
54    Pollack, The Engines of European Integration, p. 45.
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days of the EEAS, the EU member states aimed to establish control of the ser-
vice, in particular through securing key positions for their representatives. 
The HR/VP is appointed and can also be fired by the European Council in 
agreement with the Commission President. The HR must then be approved as a 
VP of the Commission with the rest of the College by the European Parliament. 
The EU member states insisted on having at least one-third of the EEAS com-
ing from the member states’ national diplomatic services. An extra motivating 
factor for the United Kingdom and France in agreeing to the establishment of 
the EEAS was the calculation that they would be able to dominate EU foreign 
policy by sending their highly capable diplomats to the EEAS.55 
The relevant Commission and Council Secretariat staff were transferred to 
the EEAS immediately, but appointments from the member states’ domestic 
diplomatic services progressed slowly. Filling the EEAS appointments illus-
trates competition between the EU member states in aiming to control the 
EEAS by having their national representatives in key positions. In February 
2010, France and Germany expressed discontent about Catherine Ashton’s 
reliance on British officials in her cabinet and in the EEAS working groups. 
Paris and Berlin interpreted this as an attempt to secure London’s long-term 
influence over EU foreign policy.56 France initially resisted the transfer of the 
Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) from the Council Secretariat 
to the EEAS. However, France ultimately agreed, after making a deal with 
Finland and winning the appointment of a French national, Claude-France 
Arnould, as head of the CMPD. Berlin and Paris also agreed that Germany 
would have the position of Deputy Secretary-General for EEAS Political Affairs 
(Helga Schmid), while France would appoint the new Secretary-General of the 
Council.57 France also secured the position of Secretary-General of the EEAS 
and Poland’s Maciej Popowski was appointed as a Deputy Secretary-General 
of the EEAS. 
In 2011, more than half of the corporate board and management positions 
in the EEAS headquarters, as well as one-third of the management positions 
in the delegations, went to the EU member states’ diplomats.58 Moreover, 
sixteen out of the 25 vacant ambassadorial positions were occupied by mem-
ber-state diplomats; seven by those coming from the EEAS; and only two by 
55    Kluth and Pilegaard, ‘The Making of the EU’s External Action Service’.
56    Ian Traynor, ‘Germany and France Dispute Lady Ashton’s “Excessive” EU Powers’, The 
Guardian (February 2010).
57    Smith, ‘The European External Action Service and the Security–Development Nexus’.
58    HR/VP, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission (Brussels: EEAS, 22 December 2011).
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European Commission representatives, although the Commission received 
the right to consent to the ‘list of candidates’ to be appointed as the heads of 
EU  delegations.59 Many important ambassadorial positions — such as those in 
China, Brazil, Japan, Turkey and the United Nations — were given to national 
diplomats.60 Already at the end of 2011, 19 per cent of the service originated 
from EU national diplomatic services and most of these diplomats occu-
pied senior positions. It is therefore not surprising that some EEAS officials 
originating from the institutions thought that candidates from member-state 
diplomatic services had benefited from the lobbying by their capitals.61 The 
member states’ position was also strengthened legally, since staff regulations 
allowed the HR/VP to give priority to national diplomats until 30 June 2013. 
An EEAS official confirmed in an August 2015 interview that: ‘The member-
state diplomats’ distribution is disproportionately on the higher echelons of 
the EEAS, both in headquarters and the EU delegations’.62
The European Parliament also battled to widen its supervisory role over 
the EU’s foreign policy actors. The HR’s appointment and accountability 
to the European Parliament is linked to its double-hatted nature. Although the 
European Parliament can reject the appointment of the HR as a VP by not giv-
ing its consent, it is less clear how the European Parliament can hold other 
EU high-level officials accountable. The European Parliament’s Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (AFET) hears the EU Special Representatives and the Heads 
of Delegation after their appointment, but before they are dispatched to the 
third countries. Therefore, the European Parliament’s consent is not required 
for their appointments.63 Although a number of MEPs insisted on public hear-
ings for the Heads of Delegation prior to their dispatch, this stipulation was 
rejected by the HR/VP.64 After a struggle between the HR/VP and MEPs on the 
format of the hearings, the controversy appears to have been solved in favour 
of holding an exchange of views in camera.
59    Council of the European Union, ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities’ (2010), PE-CONS 
52/10, Art. 95(2).
60    Staffan Hemra, Thomas Raines and Richard Whitman, A Diplomatic Entrepreneur: Making 
the Most of the European External Action Service, Chatham House Report (London: RIIA, 
2011), p. 8.
61    Juncos and Pomorska, ‘In the Face of Adversity’, p. 1339.
62    Interview, August 2015.
63    Raube, ‘The European External Action Service and the European Parliament’, p. 69. 
64    ‘Ashton Eases through Parliament Hearing’, Euractiv (12 January 2010).
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 Financing
The ability of the principal to cut an agent’s funding offers the possibility to 
sanction the opportunistic behaviour of an agent.65 However, making budget 
cuts often comes with adverse side effects for the principal, thus decreasing 
the credibility of the threat. The principal needs its agents to be functional in 
order for the agents to deliver the outcomes sought by the principal. An agent 
will not be able to accomplish the desired results if it is denied its budget.66 
Moreover, in the EU structure, cutting the Commission’s budget for policies 
such as agriculture or cohesion funds will have serious issues for the member 
states’ domestic constituencies and will complicate the re-election campaigns 
of national politicians of affected states. 
Prior to the establishment of the EEAS, the member states insisted that 
the EEAS operate with a view to ‘budget neutrality’. Although the EEAS was 
given more responsibilities than its predecessors (DG Relex and the Council 
Secretariat, etc.) combined, any attempt to increase the budget met the resis-
tance of some EU member states. The United Kingdom leads in its strong oppo-
sition to a budgetary increase for the EEAS. In May 2011, the HR/VP requested 
a € 26.9 million increase in the 2012 budget for the EEAS. The request was fol-
lowed by British Minister for Europe David Lidington’s criticism: ‘I think that 
they have got to get real as far as the budget is concerned. This 5.8 per cent that 
they’re asking for is somewhat ludicrous’.67 In 2013, the UK House of Lords’ 
European Union Sub-Committee on External Affairs published a report insist-
ing that the EEAS’s budget neutrality be prioritized.68 
The European Commission also plays an important role in budgetary mat-
ters. The EEAS prepares proposals such as country allocations, country and 
regional strategic papers, and national and regional indicative programmes.69 
However, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)70 is conducted 
under the responsibility of the Neighbourhood Commissioner, and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Development 
65    Pollack, The Engines of European Integration, p. 43.
66    Terry M. Moe, ‘The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public Bureaucracy’, 
in Oliver E. Williamson (ed.), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present 
and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-153.
67    Quoted in Andrew Rettman, ‘UK Attacks Ashton over “Ludicrous” Budget Proposal’, 
EUobserver (24 May 2011).
68    House of Lords’ European Union Committee, ‘11th Report of Session 2012-2013: The EU’s 
External Action Service Report’ (London: House of Lords, 19 March 2013).
69    Interview, July 2011.
70    Formerly the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).
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Fund (EDF)71 are the responsibility of the Development Commissioner.72 Other 
external instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability or civilian aspects 
of the CFSP (but not expenditure of the CSDP), are also funded from the com-
munity budget.73 The EEAS also shares with the European Commission the 
control over the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.74 
The Commission therefore still controls a large bulk of foreign policy expendi-
ture, thus limiting the discretion of the EEAS.
As well as the EU member states and the European Commission, also the 
European Parliament acquired strong budgetary authority over the EEAS. 
The European Parliament successfully insisted on recognition of the EEAS 
as the equivalent of an institution in budgetary matters. The intergovernmen-
tal budget line for the EEAS was rejected and the EEAS is fully funded under 
the community budget. Like the rest of the EU institutions, the EEAS therefore 
has its own budget section and acts within the limits set by the financial regu-
lations applicable to the EU general budget. In practice, this means that the 
EEAS’s budget is subject to the discharge procedure, similar to other EU insti-
tutions, and is therefore accountable to the European Parliament. 
 Agency Revision
The relations between a principal and an agent are dynamic; delegation is 
an ongoing process. The experiences of each delegation are noted down and 
their benefits and failures are decisive in issuing further transfers of authority.75 
Revising the mandate of a given agent is a logical continuation of the delega-
tion, since, although both principal and agent are regarded as rational players, 
they do not act on the basis of full information but on the information avail-
able. The member-state principal realizes that the agent, once created, may 
exploit its autonomy over time; however, EU member states are not able to pre-
dict the exact shape of the developments. Moreover, changes in the number 
of principals over a certain period of time also influence the strategic milieu.76 
On the one hand, EU member states may try to stop the agent’s exploitation of 
71    The EDF is outside of the EU budget.
72    Kamil Zwolski, ‘The EU and a Holistic Security Approach after Lisbon: Competing Norms 
and the Power of the Dominant Discourse’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 7 
(2012), pp. 988-1005.
73    Raube, ‘The European External Action Service and the European Parliament’, p. 69.
74    Smith, ‘The European External Action Service and the Security–Development Nexus’, 
pp. 1309.
75    Jonas Tallberg, ‘Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What 
Consequences?’, West European Politics, vol. 25, no. 1 (2002), pp. 27-28.
76    Tallberg, ‘Delegation to Supranational Institutions’, p. 37.
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its autonomy through agency revision. On the other hand, EU member-state 
governments may boost the competences of an agent in order to provide it 
with extra tools to maximize the possibility of achieving their objectives. 
The agent’s mandate can be revised through treaty change and Council 
decisions. Modifying an agent’s mandate through treaties has proved to be the 
most effective yet most complicated option. Mark Pollack calls it the ‘nuclear 
option’ and an ultimate threat against the agent by the principal.77 Treaty revi-
sion, however, is a fairly complicated process that engages the Council, the 
IGCs and supranational institutions and requires agreement by unanimity 
and ratification by each EU member state. The failure of the Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) and the long road to enactment of the 
Lisbon Treaty are but examples that illustrate the complexity of the process. 
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned constraints have not forced the EU mem-
ber states to abandon the treaty-revision option. Such a revision was success-
fully carried out eight times in the last five decades, although each case had its 
own rationale, met different kinds of challenges and overcame them in rather 
innovative ways.
Devising Council decisions where the details of the agency mandate are 
outlined is yet another option for agency revision. Since Council decisions are 
not part of a treaty, the legislative principal has the ‘power to override agency 
behaviour through new legislation and to revise the administrative procedures 
laid down in the agent’s mandate’,78 without resorting to the long and exhaus-
tive ‘nuclear option’. Moreover, a number of the European Commission’s exec-
utive powers that are established by Council regulations have an ‘expiration 
date’. The existence of a fixed expiration date within the agent’s mandate pro-
vides the principal with the possibility of avoiding a ‘default condition’,79 since 
the agent’s mandate has to be extended and is automatically open to further 
revisions.
The EEAS is a product of consequent delegation and agency revisions 
through treaty-making and Council decisions. The EU member states have 
revised the European Commission’s and Council Secretariat’s mandates 
through treaty changes and Council decisions and have created, inter alia, 
the post of the HR/VP and the EEAS. In order to make the EEAS operational, the 
77    Mark A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the European Community’, 
International Organization, vol. 51, no. 1 (1997), p. 118.
78    Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the European Community’, p. 109.
79    Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and 
European Integration’, Public Administration, vol. 66, no. 3 (1988), pp. 239-278.
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‘quadrilogues’ have interpreted and elaborated the treaty provisions in the 
Council decisions. 
The Council decision that established the EEAS identified 2014 as the time-
frame to revise the organization and functioning of the EEAS based on the HR/
VP.80 This revision, however, was postponed until 2015. Specifying the date for 
revision of the EEAS decision plays the role of an ‘expiration date’ for the first 
stage of the contractual relationship between the EU member states as prin-
cipal and the EEAS as agent. This excludes the ‘default condition’, since the 
EEAS’s mandate is automatically open for modification. As far as formal deci-
sion-making goes, the member states — in the Council framework — retain 
the right to revise their decision, with the European Commission consent-
ing and the European Parliament having a consultative role. The EU member 
states will acquire the opportunity to revise the EEAS’s mandate, but this can 
only be assessed after 2015.
 Conclusions
The EU member states have actively participated in every stage of the EEAS’s 
creation and activity. By revising the European Commission’s mandate and 
transferring some functions that were formerly performed by the Council 
Secretariat, the EU member states as the principal have been the driving force 
behind the EEAS. Through ex-ante administrative procedures, the EU member 
states defined the framework of the EEAS’s actions, outlined the instruments 
that it is expected to implement and described the procedures that it has 
to follow. 
The EEAS is ex-post monitored and controlled through so-called ‘police 
patrol’ and horizontal checks. The EU member states ‘police patrol’ the EEAS 
through the European Council, FAC, COREPER, the PSC and the CFSP-related 
Council working groups. The HR/VP and the EEAS chair the FAC, PSC and a 
number of relevant working groups. Conversely, COREPER is chaired by the 
rotating presidency. Analysis of the decision-making in the Council struc-
tures reveals that the member states’ representatives are effectively in charge 
of the EU foreign-policy decision-making process in general and the EEAS in 
particular.
The EEAS is tied to the European Commission on multiple levels, starting 
from the services up to the HR/VP. The linkages between the Commission DGs 
80    Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Establishing the 
Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service’, art. 13(3).
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in dealing with the European Union’s external relations and the EEAS often 
result in tensions that serve the purpose of horizontal checks. The European 
Parliament managed to use its co-decision powers in financial and staff regu-
lation to acquire a role of co-decider in the decision establishing the EEAS, 
although in the latter case the Lisbon Treaty ascribes a merely consultative 
role to the European Parliament. The European Parliament was successful in 
extending its political control over the HR/VP and the EEAS. 
The ex-post monitoring of the EEAS is complemented by the mechanism 
of sanctions, such as appointments, financing and revision of the mandate 
that the EU member states (can) implement to control the EEAS’s activities. 
In terms of personnel, the EU member states have the right to hire and fire 
the HR/VP. By inserting their representative in the service, the member states 
aim to retain strong control over EU foreign policy. The European Commission 
receives the right to approve the HR’s appointment and the European 
Parliament gives consent to the HR as a VP of the European Commission with 
the rest of the College of Commissioners. EU member states, along with the 
European Parliament, decide on the budget of the EEAS, which is presented by 
the European Commission after receiving the HR/VP’s estimate of the EEAS’s 
expenses accompanied by a report on the staff of the EEAS in both the cen-
tral administration and the delegations. Before submitting the expenses to the 
European Commission, the HR/VP holds consultations with the Commissioners 
for Development, Neighbourhood and Humanitarian Aid policies in order to 
estimate the administrative expenditure of the EEAS. 
The EEAS has been established through treaty-making and Council deci-
sions that have revised the Commission’s and the Council Secretariat’s man-
date, transferring some of their departments and staff to the EEAS along with 
EU member states’ diplomats. Based on Council decisions, the EEAS’s man-
date will continue to be revised. The HR/VP presented a review to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Commission in 2013. Formally, 
the EU member states enjoy the right to revise their decision establishing the 
EEAS after receiving the consent of the European Commission and consulting 
the European Parliament, both of which are expected to defend and expand 
their ‘turf ’. 
Adding to the principal–agent literature, this case confirms that an agent 
that is delegated competences in a politically sensitive issue-area such as for-
eign policy — a central aspect of the nation-state principal’s sovereignty — 
is tightly controlled by the delegating principal and did exhibit unwarranted 
opportunistic behaviour in the early years of its existence. Moreover, the 
analysis finds that the principal–agent framework is suitable for evaluating the 
member states’ control over the EEAS, as well as the horizontal checks that are 
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facilitated by the European Commission. However, the model falls short on 
conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier 
to the principal–agent relationship. 
By analysing the control mechanisms, this article concludes that the EU 
member states currently effectively control the EEAS. However, because of the 
dynamic challenges that the EU is facing in its foreign policy, it remains to be 
seen whether the EEAS will be able to increase its autonomy and room for 
manoeuvre vis-à-vis the member states over time and on certain issues and geo-
graphical areas. Finally, the EU’s internal institutional dynamics might equally 
affect the EEAS’s discretion in the future, with the European Commission and/
or the European Parliament curtailing or supporting greater autonomy of 
the EEAS. 
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